

religious camp, the Messiah has to unify the two by establishing a new value system and a new religion. The persecution laid by the established religions are unavoidable, and the Messiah has to overcome this difficulty. Jesus, who came two thousand years ago, could not perfect his mission, and he was killed on the cross because of the persecution. At that time the Second Coming was destined. The world can attain sacralization, which is the realization of God's ideal of creation on the earth, at the Advent of the Lord of the Second Coming, who can unify all the religions, bringing unity to the religious camp and the non-religious camp."

It was my privilege to have this opportunity to offer my thoughts on the essential theme of the issue of sacralization based on what I was taught by Rev. Moon.

Session IV

Unification Thought and History

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Introduction

The writing of history is a universal phenomenon and historical writing in its varied contexts has achieved a high degree of maturity. Nonetheless, [t]he "theory of history" has been called "the most neglected province of philosophy." (Meyercoff 1959: 25) Aristotle considered poetry "more philosophical than history, because poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." (Adler and Gorman 1952: 713) Similarly, Descartes specifically excluded history from his *Discourse on Method*, making logical, analytical studies of historical inquiry as rare in modern philosophy as in the ancient world. As a result, history as a distinct branch of knowledge with its own methods and standards is a comparatively new thing.

Another reason why the philosophy of history is as yet in its infancy stems from the fact that the word "history" itself is ambiguous. It, at once, refers to (1) the actual course of events; and (2) a particular branch of inquiry. To borrow an analogy from science,

It is as if we used the word "physics" to name both the object of study and the science of that object; whereas normally we tend to use "physics" for the science and refer to its subjectmatter as the physical world. We do not say that matter in motion is physics, but that it is the object of physics, one of the things a physicist studies. We might similarly have adopted the convention of using "history" in a restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge or a kind of writing, and then called the phenomena written about or studied "historical" but not "history." (Adler and Gorman 1952: 711)

This, however, is not the prevailing usage. Instead, the split in definitions has led to a situation in which two separate branches of philosophical inquiry are commonly referred to as the philosophy of history. Contemporary accounts usually refer to them as *critical* and *speculative* philosophies of history. The former "endeavors to make clear the nature of the historian's own inquiry, in order to 'locate' it, as it were, on the map of knowledge." The latter "seeks to discover in history, the course of events, a pattern or meaning which lies beyond the purview of the ordinary historian." (Dray 1964: 1)

This split between critical and speculative philosophies of history along with the virtual eclipse of speculative approaches in recent times has had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, modern historical science has progressed significantly in devising critical methods for sifting, testing, collating, and evaluating documentary sources. It also has developed rigorous standards for judging the impartiality, objectivity, and truthfulness of a historical work. Additionally, recent historiography has attempted to be non-reductionistic. Rather than seeking to "constrain reality

within a system," it has "learnt appreciation of the subtle shades of individuality, respect for irreducible particularity, acceptance of the untold multitude of facts." (Meyercoff 1959: 11-12)

These gains, however, are more than balanced off by serious liabilities. In part, due to the increasingly critical standards for the acceptance of historical fact, there has been a trend away from "universal history" or even a "universal point of view" and toward ever more narrowly conceived topics of research. This has led to what one ranking historian has termed "a vast and growing mass of dry-as-dust factual histories, of minutely specialized monographs, of would-be historians knowing more and more about less and less, sunk without a trace in an ocean of facts." (Carr 1961: 14) At the same time, modern psychology and sociology's depiction of "secret, irrational powers," perspectival biases and "class interests" behind the facade of reason has undercut the possibility of "objective historical truth" and contributed to the rise of relativism. That is to say, "In place of the theory that history has no meaning, we are offered here the theory of an infinity of meaning, none more right than any other-which comes to much the same thing." (Carr 1961: 30) Finally, scientific historiography has snapped the link between history and religion. In the modern setting, "Religion is threatened with becoming irrelevant to interpreting history ... while the writing of history, supported by a sophisticated methodology, remains a technical endeavor given to the reconstruction of aspects of the past." (Breisach 1986: 382)

Unification Thought addresses these dilemmas of contemporary historiography. That is, it confronts questions related to universal history, meaning in history, and the link between history and religion. It also deals with more technical matters, such as determinism and non-determinism as well as a variety of other issues. Unfortunately, critical and speculative philosophies of history have operated at cross-purposes, having little in common and functioning virtually as closed systems. Given this situation, Unification Thought's "Theory of History" is singular in that it embodies components of each. Thus, a major contribution of Unification Thought's view of history is its creation of a conceptual framework within which critical and

speculative traditions can interact. To reinforce this claim, it is necessary to examine these traditions in greater detail, highlighting their historical emergence, key concepts and specific limitations. Having done so, we will be in a better position to consider the Unification view of history and to appraise its implications for contemporary historiography.

Critical Philosophy of History

Critical philosophies of history have been dominant, at least within Western academic circles, for a century. While a variety of causes, social as well as intellectual, contributed to its emergence, two factors were pre-eminently influential: a movement known as "historicism" and the rise of an empirical, scientific historiography. Both of these trends combined in the nineteenth century to defeat traditional philosophical approaches to history. (Meyercoff 1959: 9)

Historicism was a complex movement and is subject to diverse interpretation. Basically, it was a by-product of the 19th Century romantic revolt against the enlightenment and rationalism. Hence, it rejected rationalistic, philosophical approaches to history.

Historicism's theses were fairly straightforward. As to content, history's subjectmatter is "human life in its totality and multiplicity."

As to method, it is the historian's responsibility "to portray the bewildering, unsystematic variety of historical forms-people, nations, cultures, customs, institutions, songs, myths, and thoughts-in their unique living expressions and in the process of continuous growth and transformation." As such, history's methods are not entirely rational. J.G. Herder, one of historicism's first and foremost spokesmen, was the first to appeal to the principle of empathy. One must "feel" oneself "into a period, into life, into history as a whole." Expressed slightly differently, the historian must "bring back to life past shadows of people and movements, conflicts and victories, landscapes and physical hardships, secret passions and social forces, in their specific and unique characteristics-instead of enshrining them in dry-as-dust categories of philosophy." (Meyercoff 1959: 10-11)

The rise of history as an empirical discipline reinforced the romantic revolt against philosophy. Given fresh stimulus by the opening of European diplomatic archives, the goal of presenting history "exactly as it happened" became the manifesto of nineteenth century empirical historiography. In particular, Leopold von Ranke together with his contemporaries and successors of the Prussian Historical School made signal advances in the scientific approach to history. Ranke's "indefatigable research" and "monumental works" help establish the critical methods and rigorous standards mentioned in the introduction. These techniques subsequently were taught to a new generation of "scientific" historians who flocked from all over the world to the academic seminars of the Historical School. This training, in turn, "kindled the conviction that history had arrived at last as a legitimate scientific discipline." (Meyercoff 1959: 12-14)

Historicism and historical empiricism together combined to counter speculative approaches to history. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to regard today's critical philosophy of history as a simple synthesis of these trends. In fact, critical philosophers of history rejected elements within both. For example, just as history had begun to establish a strong claim for status as a science, a reaction set in against the scientific trend. This, in general, "was the result of increasing awareness that 'the systematized method which distinguishes a science' was as incompatible with history as the rational method which distinguished traditional philosophy." Whether philosophical or scientific, both were "systems" and, hence, the "very antithesis of life, movement, and individual existence." On the other hand, critical philosophers of history have not entirely embraced the aesthetic and subjectivist tendencies of historicism. Thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Benedetto Croce and R.G. Collingwood have undertaken the "task of disentangling ... the specific logical problems that distinguished history from other sciences." For them, it was "a matter of discovering a 'logic' of history which would be neither philosophical nor scientific in the traditional sense, yet would promise to save the 'appearance' of history as an empirical, objective discipline." (Meyercoff 1959: 14, 17)

What, then, are the logical problems with which the critical philosophy of history grapples? The first of these has to do with the nature of historical understanding. Dilthey and his followers, cited above, felt impelled to draw a sharp distinction between those sciences which take as their subject matter the physical, nonhuman world and those which study human beings. Simply stated, there were two scientific methodologies to be worked out, instead of one: the logical structure of historical explanation was taken to be essentially different from the explanation of physical phenomena. The human sciences could not aspire to the predictive powers of the sciences of the physical universe. Moreover, historical explanation required a reconstruction in the historian's mind of the character of those who acted in the past and of the circumstances under which they acted.

This view remained the most influential for the first three or four decades of this century. Although there were dissenters (c.f., Morris Cohen, Karl Popper, and Maurice Mandelbaum), dissent did not coalesce into a coherent position until publication, in 1942, of an article by Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History." Hempel's basic claim was that historians explain events of human history precisely in the same way that natural scientists explain the events of the physical world. Subsequently referred to as the "covering law model" of historical explanation, Hempel's formulation sparked considerable debate. Opponents have denied its appropriateness on the ground that historical events are "unique and unrepeatable," that they are subject to unpredictable human factors, and that they are so immensely complex that it cannot be expected "that there will ever be a body of the requisite, well-confirmed laws to 'cover' such events as revolutions, losses of battles, legal decisions, or religious reforms." Covering law theorists have countered these objections in various ways. They, for example, agree that historical events are unique but "point out that, strictly speaking, so is any event." They also have been willing to admit, as in natural science, "that universal laws ... often have to give place to probability hypothesis." In any case, the nature of historical understanding as yet has not been satisfactorily resolved. (Dray 1967a: 8-12)

A second basic question addressed by critical philosophy of history is the extent to which historical conclusions can be represented as objective. Those who attest that historians can legitimately claim the status of "objective truth" for their conclusions have been called "objectivists." Those who deny this possibility have been referred to as "relativists." Interestingly, it has been pointed out that "[w]hen historians themselves discuss the question of whether history can be objective, they are notoriously pessimistic." The American historian Charles Beard maintained that history is not objective,

because the historian cannot "observe" his subject matter as a chemist can; because his documentation of the past is fragmentary; because he must select even from this "partial record"; because he must "arrange" his materials in reporting his results; because in employing organizing concepts he imposes a "structure" on the past which it never really had; because the events he is interested in involve "ethical and aesthetic considerations"; [and] because no historian can bring to his work a "neutral mind".

Beard likewise noted, "Whatever acts of purification the historian may perform, he yet remains human, a creature of time, place, circumstance, interests, predilections, culture." (Beard 1956: 323-25) Other historians and philosophers have questioned whether a historical inquiry must be regarded as nonobjective because it requires "value judgement" on the part of the historian. (Dray 1964: 21-40) The status of causal judgements historians make in their inquiries is a third major problem with which critical philosophers of history deal. At issue here is a tension between methodological holists and individualists. The former deny that history is primarily about the actions of individual human agents. What historians study, according to holists, are "large-scale social events and conditions like conquests and depressions, or the careers of empires, parliaments, and classes." These, moreover, are understood to be best explained by reference to large-scale societal laws. Methodological individualists, on the other hand, "hold that the explanation of social phenomena can be found

piecemeal in the actions of relevant human agents." A variant of the latter perspective is the so-called "Cleopatra's Nose" theory of history, that is, "the theory that history is, by and large, a chapter of accidents, a series of events determined by chance coincidences and attributable only to the most casual causes." Hence, "the result of the battle of Actium was due not to the sort of causes commonly postulated by historians, but to Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra." (Carr 1961 : 128)

Speculative Philosophy of History

Speculative philosophies of history differ from critical philosophies of history in that they are less preoccupied with raising questions than they are with supplying answers. In particular, speculative accounts of history generally claim that there is in historical events a "significance" or "meaning" which goes beyond the understanding of the ordinary practicing historian. Nonetheless, the construction of speculative systems of history is nowadays regarded as being "out of fashion." William Dray noted that the development of "first order historical studies" has raised serious problems for these systems as "it became more and more difficult to represent speculative constructions as soundly based in the light of increasingly critical standards for the acceptance of historical fact." (Dray 1964 : 61) Working historians have labeled speculative hypotheses as "metahistorical" rather than authentically historical and have attacked them for oversimplification, factual inaccuracy, and conceptual imprecision. Under the influence of an empiricist and anti-speculative trend of philosophy in this century, professional philosophers have regarded speculative philosophy of history with misgivings chiefly as a result of "its having being practiced, since the mid-nineteenth century ... by social theorists, historians, and theologians." (Dray 1967b : 251)

Despite these critiques, there remains a vital and recurrent interest in histories of this type. Some have asserted that this is so, at least in the West, "because in a predominantly Judeo-

Christian culture the expectation that history should be 'meaningful' is so strong." (Dray 2) Others have made a case for speculative constructions on more broadly based moral grounds. According to W.H. Walsh, the main factor which gives rise to them ... is the feeling that there is something morally outrageous in the notion that history has no rhyme or reason in it which impels men to seek for a pattern in the chain of historical events. If there is no pattern, then, as we commonly say, the sufferings and disasters which historians narrate are 'pointless' and 'meaningless'; and there is a strong element in human nature which revolts against accepting any such conclusion. (Walsh 1967 : 119)

Immanuel Kant, likewise, referred to "a certain feeling of disgust" on observing "the actions of man displayed on the great stage of the world." In his view, the task of the philosopher as regards history is to show that, appearances notwithstanding, history is a rational process "proceeding on an intelligible plan and tending toward a goal which moral reason can approve." (Walsh 1967 : 121) Apart from religious or moral rationales, the quest for meaning beyond "bare narration" and piecemeal analysis is as well a psychological necessity. The "nightmare quality" of Kafka's novels, for example,

lies in the fact that nothing that happens has any apparent cause that can be ascertained : this leads to the total disintegration of the human personality, which is based on the assumption that events have causes, and that enough of these causes are ascertainable to build up in the human mind a pattern of past and present sufficiently coherent to serve as a guide to action. (Carr 1961 : 122)

Speculative interest in history can be traced back to the beginning of Western philosophy. However, it is less from Greek philosophy than from Judaic and Christian religion that most Western discussion about the meaning or significance of history derives. That is, where

reason and observation could find, at most, "a vast Ferris wheel of ups and downs, a succession of cycles or spirals," the "eye of faith" discerned "in a unique historical process the redemptive activity of God." (Dray 1967b: 250; Meyercoff 1959: 1) St. Augustine's *The City of God* (412-426) is the classic philosophical statement of this view. History, according to Augustine and his successors, encompasses the life of all mankind; it is "universal history," not only "the history of local, regional, or national units as for Greek and Roman historians." History, moreover, "has a beginning; and in its beginning are contained ... the "seeds" of its development and end.

In short, history has an origin and goal and moves in a linear progression." Additionally, the movement of history is "not an arbitrary succession" but an "intelligible process" guided by "the transcendent design of a Divine Intelligence." Nonetheless, the goal of history is "beyond history." The secular history of mankind is a "vast detour" in the "transhistorical drama of human salvation." (Meyercoff 1959: 3-4; Dray 1967b: 250)

Christian interpretations of history, in the Augustinian tradition, dominated Western thought for more than a thousand years. They were discarded "only when the Renaissance challenged religious authority in history as in other areas of thought and culture." The "liberation of history from theology" reached its fullest development in the eighteenth century. Figures such as Voltaire, Vico, Herder, and Kant "created a historical consciousness which was predominantly immanent, not transcendent; and they employed rational, not religious concepts." (Meyercoff 1959: 4-5) Some of these thinkers claimed to have discovered inherent evolutionary tendencies in historical change and progress. Culminating in Hegel's a famous *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (1836), this new secular philosophical tradition sought no "escape" from time "into a faith beyond history." Still, while repudiating some Christian presuppositions, it retained others. Hegel's system, for example, "reflects the Augustinian model; only it eliminates the dimension of faith and translates the religious concepts into a rationalistic vocabulary." Their "common heritage" lay in their search for a meaning of history.

During the nineteenth century, a number of avowedly "scientific" attempts to comprehend history as a whole—notably, those of Comte, Spencer and Marx—emerged. Comte and other positivists, alleged to have uncovered empirical laws of progress. Spencer adapted evolutionary principles to social development. Marx, of course, elaborated a materialist conception of history which, nonetheless, retained "the Hegelian view of history as a dynamic process whose forward movement is dialectically generated by conflicts or contradictory principles." (Gardner 1967: 520) He, likewise, affirmed that autonomous historical processes finally would generate perfect social and individual freedom. Twentieth century system-builders like Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee "have offered accounts of history with more obvious claims to 'scientific' status." Both "argue inductively to laws governing the standard development of cultures or civilizations and use them to predict the fate of their own." Both take seriously "the task of exemplifying, if not rigorously testing, their large hypotheses in a wide range of historical materials." Toynbee, especially, had "at his disposal a wealth of historical data never approached in the history of speculation." (Dray 1967b: 251)

Amid the diversity which characterizes speculative approaches to history, three common characteristics stand out. First, all of these speculative systems, whether religiously, metaphysically, or empirically based, seek to define the overall *pattern* of history. Speculative philosophers of history typically discern one of three basic patterns. Either history has proceeded in a certain direction, linear-fashion, or it has repeated itself in succeeding cycles, or it has been formless and chaotic. These possibilities can also be asserted in various combinations. For instance, "a theory which asserts chaotic development may admit fragmentary developments of either cyclical or linear types ... like Spengler's account of cultures which spring up willy-nilly, without relation to each other, but once started on their careers, tend to exemplify a common pattern." A cyclical development also may be combined with a linear for a "spiriling advance" like that advocated by Vico who perceived in history "a pattern of recurring yet cumulative cultural growth and decay." Hegel emphasized a linear development but noted a recurring three-stage

pattern in the progression of world historical eras. (Dray 1967b: 252)

Beyond asserting patterns, speculative philosophers of history usually attempt to understand the specific *mechanisms* of historical change; that is, they seek to explain how a particular pattern prevailed. Some claim to have discovered a body of empirical laws undergirding historical processes. Others look to enumerate the "most important causal factors of the historical process." Marx's contention that "substructural" rather than "superstructural" features of society have causal primacy might be considered a case in point here. Carlyle's "great man" theory of history is another. These accounts tend toward a "schematic model" line of historical explanation. The Hegelian idea that historical advance is "dialectical," that it takes place through a series of tensions and resolutions which exhibit some rational or logical order, is an example of such a model. Toynbee's formula of "challenge-and-response" and certain theological expositions of "original sin" are others.

Thirdly, speculative philosophers "have generally sought meaning in the further sense of assurance that the whole process has purpose or value." (Dray 1967b: 253) Hegel, for instance, saw the ultimate aim of philosophical speculation about history as "theodicy," the "justification of the ways of God" so that humanity "might be reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil in the world." Kant took a similar position. Toynbee sought to know any spiritually significant purpose gained by the "vain repetitions" of the cyclical life of civilizations and concludes that they serve as the matrix of emerging higher religions. Marx, though despising the exploitation of bourgeoisie society, justified society's existence in its own "proper time" as a necessary step toward the eventual ending of human alienation. It is at this point, however, that "speculation becomes inseparable from metaphysics, ethics, and religion." (Dray 1964: 65; 1967b: 253)

Unification View of History

I suggested in the introduction to this paper that the

Unificationview of history addresses the dilemmas of contemporary historiography. I also suggested that it embodies components of both critical and speculative approaches to history, thereby creating a framework within which they can interact. In this section, I will undertake a relatively straightforward exposition of the Unification position, underlining its points of contact with views already discussed. Having done that, I will offer an appraisal of Unification Thought's particular contribution in the concluding section of the paper.

First, a note on sources. At the present time, chapters describing Unification Thought's "Theory of History" exist in two separately published texts, *Unification Thought* [UT] (1973) and *Explaining Unification Thought* [EUT] (1981). In addition, there currently circulates a chapter on the same topic in *Fundamentals of Unification Thought* [FUT] (1988), an as yet unpublished manuscript which has served as a basis for recent seminars in the Orient and the United States. All of these materials attempt to systematize the ideas within the Unification Principle (sometimes translated as *Divine Principle*) which, in turn, derives from the thought of Rev. S.M. Moon. A complete elaboration of Unification historiography would take into account both theory and practice (i.e., the writing of history). In this paper, I will restrict myself to the view of history as articulated in the three Unification Thought texts cited above.

An initial point to be noted about Unification Thought's "Theory of History" is its self-consciously philosophical approach. As stated in FUT,

The theory of history as dealt with here is not a direct description of historical facts. It deals with the way of looking at history, including how history started, by what kinds of laws it is guided, in what direction it is proceeding, and so on. It is so to speak, a philosophy of history. (UTI 1988: 1)

The references in this quotation to history's origin, its "laws," and the "direction history is proceeding" would appear to type the Unification position as a speculative philosophy of history. To a

certain extent this is accurate. On the other hand, Unification Thought clearly embodies a critical component. This is especially apparent in its "outline of the representative traditional views of history" (UTI 1981 : 282-290; UTI 1988 : 34-44). Specialists in the history of philosophy probably would not find Unification Thought's summary treatment of the Greek cyclical view, the providential view, the progressive view (Hegel et.al.), the revolutionary view (Marx), the philosophy-of-life view (Dilthey, Bergson), and the cultural view (Spengler, Toynbee) overly compelling, in part due to limitations of space. However, more important is the fact that Unification Thought recognizes the necessity of setting its own theory within the context of other views. This is a positive feature which leaves open the possibility of further elaboration and the establishment of additional points of contact. It also helps lay a foundation for critical as well as speculative reflection.

Of the representative views covered, Unification Thought gives particular attention to the providential and revolutionary (Marxist) views, even to the extent of developing a comparative analysis (UTI 1981 : 290-293, UTI 1988 : 44-52). Although the present collapse of communist regimes may temper future analyses, one reason for this emphasis is the perceived strengths of historical materialism and the corresponding weaknesses of Christianity in presenting a convincing view of history. In explaining how the communist movement "spread all over the world, overwhelming Western Christian countries," Unification Thought asserts, "The reason-without exaggeration-is that the revolutionary view of history has been more persuasive than the providential view of history." (UTI 1981 : 290) For all of its falsehoods and distortions, historical materialism is given credit for co-opting "scientific" laws and for articulating "a new vision for the future," even though the communist world has not "proved itself to be a realm of freedom nor an affluent society, but its opposite." Conversely, the providential view is represented as being "rather vague," "only a matter of belief," and "inaccessible in terms useful to social science." (UTI 1981 : 291; UTI 1988 : 36) Furthermore, it is not clear as to "what resurrection means or what the millenium is like." (UTI 1981 : 293)

Unification Thought deals with providential and revolutionary views of history in some detail in order to clarify its own role. As one text asserts, "The Unification view of history came into being as an extension of the Christian view of history, and yet it overcomes the mysteriousness of the Christian view." (UTI 1988 : 52) In addition, it is argued that "a new view of history must be established that will be able to overcome historical materialism." (UTI 1988 : 2) Elsewhere, it is stated :

the Unification view of history revives the traditional dispensational view of history, which has been regarded as unscientific until today, making it possible to deal with this view as a social science by establishing the law-governed nature of history from a theological basis. (UTI 1988 : 5)

The Unification view of history might be regarded from this perspective as a "synthesis" of the Christian "thesis" and Marxist "antithesis." This, however, is to neglect Unification Thought's broader vision. That is to say, Unification Thought looks to "unify" other views of history as well. (UTI 1988 : 42-44)

What, then, is the Unification view of history? In essence, it is a view which understands history under three basic aspects: first as a "history of sin," second as a "history of re-creation," and third as a "history of restoration." (UTI 1981 : 293, UTI 1988 : 2)

A basic premise of Unificationism is that "history begins not with man's natural ascending development, but rather from an initial fall away from God." (Servito 1986 : 77) Therefore, "human history was unable to start on a principled, normal course, but came to be filled with a record of wars, pain, disasters, and the like." (UTI 1988 : 3) This view, then, "regards the creation and the Fall of man as the origin of history in the same way as the Christian dispensational view of history does." (UTI 1988 : 5) It also has continuities with traditional historiographies which have interpreted the origin of human society in terms of a loss of innocence or perfection. Ancient Indian texts spoke of a decline in four stages from the ideal stage,

or *krtayuga* to the present destructive stage of *kaliyuga*. Jewish canonical sources understood human society to have evolved from an specific act of primal disobedience while "Chinese, Greeks, and Romans spoke of a decline in more general terms: Confucian scholars saw decay as an ever-present threat (if the proper precepts were not obeyed); Greeks knew of the five consecutive ages (or races) of declining quality as described by Hesiod; Roman writers repeated tales of a lost Golden Age." (Breisach 1986: 371) The loss of innocence is an important theme in the writing of J.J. Rousseau and later romanticists. It also echoes in the Marxist conception of a primitive communal society.

Apart from the issue of human origin, crucially important for the Unification view are corresponding questions as to the direction and goal of history. Here, unlike systems which posit infinite progress or regress, Unificationism incorporates an element of indeterminism. "God," according to the Unification view, "had an ideal of creation when he created the universe, and ... envisioned the world according to this ideal of creation." (UTI 1988: 6) In this sense, the origin of history (the Fall) and history's goal (the ideal of creation) are fixed; yet "how that goal is realized is not determined." (UTI 1988: 6) Therefore, "the process that history takes, whether it will proceed straight or take a detour, or whether it will be shortened or prolonged, totally depends on the efforts of men." (UTI 1988: 6) Expressed differently, Unificationism introduces a historical theory which balances the "predeterminism" of the goal with the "indeterminism" of the process toward it. This is termed the "*theory of responsibility, or responsabilism*." (UTI 1981: 296; UTI 1988: 6)

This element of indeterminism is important, especially given Unificationism's emphasis on "the law-governed nature of history." This law-governed nature is evident in the "laws of creation" and the "laws of restoration" which Unificationism views as the "true laws" at work in history. The laws of creation are closely related to natural law, the nature of being and the first principles or categories of existence. History cannot but proceed according to these patterns as they are immanent within the created order. Hence,

Unificationism refers to laws of correlativity, give-and-take action, repulsion, dominion by the center, completion through three stages, the period of the number six, and responsibility. Just as with its conception of history as a "history of sin," so too Unificationism's account of history as a "history of re-creation" is not without precedent and has parallels with various speculative philosophies of history. The laws of correlativity, give-and-take action, and repulsion are together reminiscent of Hegel's law of the dialectic. The law of completion through three stages has numerous precursors, most notably Auguste Comte's famous "law of the three stages" which postulated that mankind as a whole has progressed through theological, metaphysical and positivist (or scientific) stages of development. The law of the period of the number six has been utilized by Augustine and others as a fundamental paradigm of historical periodization modeled on the six biblical days of creation.

The "laws of restoration" as opposed to the "laws of creation" have less to do with immanent, universal structures of creation relevant to all human beings and cultures. It rather deals with "salvation" history, that is, laws of providence established to reverse the course of the human fall. Additionally, whereas the "laws of creation" undergird forward movement and progress, the "laws of restoration," as the name implies, employ concepts of cyclical repetition. Specific ones detailed in the Unification view of history include the laws of indemnity, separation, restoration of the number four, conditioning providence, the false preceding the true, the horizontal reappearance of the vertical, and synchronous periods. Basically, Unificationism affirms that these laws both underlie and explain the persecution and hardships borne by "righteous people, sages, and saints" at the hands of dominant majorities; the separation of creative minorities from conditions of oppression; periods of trial; the significance of historical precedent; the "prosperity" of evil; recurrent conflict; and parallels of history. Unification Thought cites support for these laws in biblical tradition and secular history as well as in the thought of Toynbee and Spengler. (UTI 1981: 307-315; UTI 1988: 17-30)

A final issue addressed by Unification Thought's "Theory of

History" is that of historical change. Here, a distinction is made between "development" and "struggle." Development refers "to growth, improvement, and appearance of a new quality, all of which are irreversible progressive movements." Struggle, on the other hand, "occurs between a subject and a subject which have different purposes and different interests." The two processes are understood to be incompatible. Therefore, "When a struggle is taking place, development or progress will be suspended or even retrogression takes place." Nonetheless, it is struggle that "turns the direction of history." Based on the laws of repulsion, indemnity and separation (collectively termed the "law of turning"), a struggle ensues between the old leader of a corrupt order and a new leader :

if the good side wins, the direction in which history will proceed is turned for the better. When history reaches a definite new stage after that, an even better leader will appear. Then the old leader will stand in the relatively evil position, and a new struggle between good and evil will start again. (UTI 1988 : 32)

Should the "evil side" triumph, conditions will fester until the emergence of a new champion. The reason why these two directions (development and struggle) have arisen "is that human history is the history of re-creation and at the same time the history of the providence of restoration." According to Unification Thought, "the realm of science and technology is attained in the form of development, while [an] ethical society can be attained through the course of restoration." Moreover, development is understood to continue forever, "while restoration will come to an end when the ideal world originally intended is recovered, after which the ideal world will continue forever." (UTI 1988 : 34)

Conclusion

What are Unification Thought's particular contributions to contemporary historiography? I suggest that it offers a needed

corrective in three areas :

1. *It offers a corrective to anti-historical tendencies within the Christian/Augustinian tradition.* Conditions of twentieth century life have been such that "Christian interpretations of history, in the Augustinian tradition, have reasserted themselves strongly after a lapse of a few hundred years." The names of religious thinkers-like Kierkegaard, Berdyaev, Barth, Niebuhr, Tillich, Butterfield, Lowaith, Pieper, Dawson, and Toynbee-form an impressive list. According to Hans Meyercoff, "Their impact indicates that a Christian solution to the problem of history again finds a remarkable response, not only among specialists, but also among the public at large." Meyercoff suggests that part of that appeal stems from "the demand for a 'meaning' of history in the traditional sense that has otherwise been lost." Yet he concludes that their solution ultimately expresses a "mood of defeat and despair before the reality of history." (Meyercoff 1959 : 23)

No less than Augustine, for whom secular history was at best a "vast detour" in the "transhistorical drama of human salvation," these representatives (with the possible exception of Toynbee) have denied that there ever has been or will be an "immanent solution" to the problem of history. The net effect of this has been to further accentuate the distinction between sacred and profane history. Focusing more narrowly on the history of the church and tending "to regard the history of the rest of life as a secular concern properly handled by scholars acting as secular historians," Church historians and theologians "have come to see themselves, and to be seen, as sociologically set apart from other historians and other scholars of religion. They commonly find themselves in seminaries, Christian colleges, and distinct professional societies separate from the universities and general scholarly associations ... with the result that the relevance of Christian views of history to life as a whole could no longer be assumed." Historians, "including those who were themselves Christians," found "they could readily explain the temporal course of human affairs solely in terms of human actions ... quite apart from any believed activity of God and any sacred vision of universal history." (McIntire 1986 : 398-99) Given this

situation, a major contribution of the Unification view is its stress on the need to reintegrate the Christian qua religious view with a commitment to the life and history of the world as a whole.

2. *It offers a corrective to reductionist tendencies within speculative philosophies of history.* Speculative philosophies of history, whether metaphysical or "scientific," which "emancipated" history from theology after 1700 tended to reduce explanations to "a single theoretical law or universal rational principle." Ironically, whether practiced by Vico, Kant, Herder, Hegel, Comte, Spencer or Marx, this usage had the same practical effect as the Augustinian dismissal of profane history. That is, it excluded historical manifestations not in accord with the "causal" laws of development as mere irrelevancies. A secondary effect was the emergence of various deterministic conceptualizations. History, according to most of these theories was deemed progressive, "inevitable," and in some sense, irreversible. Subsequent reaction against efforts to constrain reality within a system and the emergence of modern critical historiography have doomed most of these speculative theories to curiosities today. The problem, however, is that most critical philosophers of history have tended to repudiate the concept of underlying laws or principles entirely.

It is here that Unification Thought makes a second contribution. How is this so? It is the case, according to Meyercoff, that "the modern historian operates with a plurality of laws and principles, the logical status of which is often very obscure." Thus, "[i]nstead of a coherent, unified pattern of world history, he discloses a great variety of different historical forms and patterns of culture. Instead of a single linear direction, he discovers multiple and incompatible directions in history—or no direction at all." (Meyercoff 1959: 21-22) From this perspective, the Unification view of history with its multiple, interacting laws (the logical status of which is not entirely specified) as well as its incorporation of indeterminacy and the possibility of regression is suggestive and more in line with the way in which historians actually proceed.

3. *It offers a corrective to the parochialism of contemporary historiography.* Mention earlier was made of the trend in modern

critical historiography away from "universal history" or even "a universal point of view" and toward ever more narrowly conceived topics of research. Mention also was made of prejudices and interests detected by modern psychology and sociology which have undercut for many the possibility of "objective historical truth" and led to the rise of relativism. Given this kind of academic and cultural impasse, it is unlikely that "solutions" will be readily forthcoming from historians nurtured within or sharing the presuppositions of modern critical historiography's milieu. Here, it is worth noting that for all their crudities, misconceptions, and even inaccuracies, bold speculative philosophies of history have exerted a decided influence upon the development of historiography and "are still operative today in much sociological and anthropological inquiry." According to Patrick Gardiner,

Although such systems may not have measured up to the grandiose claims made on their behalf by their creators, they have often left in their wake procedural suggestions and interpretive ideas of great originality which opened the eyes of historians to new ways of looking at their subject and which subsequently proved immensely fertile and illuminating when introduced at the level of ordinary explanation and research. (Gardiner 1967: 522)

Unification Thought, too, offers a number of bold, suggestive and challenging hypotheses. At the same time, it is no "armchair" view of history but is integrally connected to a socio-religious movement dedicated to a final synthesis of all sciences and philosophies under the "Unification Principle" as the basis of a new world order. Here, it is appropriate to recognize that history normally is written by its "victors." Augustine's view was dominant so long as the medieval synthesis which he helped fashion held firm. Similarly, variant secular philosophies of history accompanied the emergence of modern European nation-states (Hegel's philosophy of history, for example, was a virtual apotheosis of the Prussian state). Marx's historical materialism, too, was credible so long as communist societies, which

his theory supported, exerted varying degrees of political hegemony. On the other hand, most of today's critical philosophies of history reflect the pluralistic values of liberal Western democracies. Unification historiography will be viable to the extent that the movement of which it is a part makes good on its claim to solve "real problems" and "build the original ideal world." (UTI 1981: xxiv)

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